ABSTRACT With the boom in the production of smartphones and easy access to networks, mobile crowd-sensing (MCS) is becoming a promising and rapidly growing sensing paradigm for the Internet of Things (IoT). In MCS, workers can get rewarded by participating in data collection while traveling to their destination from some starting point. However, the privacy leakage becomes a serious and unavoidable problem that hinders users' engagement. Taking task at a specific location or even going through some seemingly innocent locations may both disclose user's sensitive location information. Simply concealing or obfuscating the sensitive locations could preserve the privacy to a certain extent, at the cost of reward reduction, which will significantly frustrate the workers. To address these issues, this paper provides a novel framework for task selection in MCS jointly covering comprehensive location privacy preservation, efficient resource consumption, and high task profits. In our framework, workers can select their paths freely, and customize their privacy requirements for protection against both direct location disclosure and destination inference attack. Two corresponding algorithms are proposed for path selection under various stages of privacy preservation. The theoretical analysis demonstrates the performance of two algorithms on both privacy and utility aspects. We also evaluate our proposed mechanisms through extensive experiments on a real-world data set. The results validate that the proposed mechanisms can achieve higher task earnings and better privacy preservation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile Crowd-Sensing (MCS) as the name suggests is the mechanism that involves collecting sensor data from a crowd of users equipped with mobile devices. In the recent years MCS is emerging as a key sensing mechanism for the Internet of Things (IoT) due to the increase in the production and use of mobile and embedded devices. Mobile users can contribute their sensor data while they traveling towards their destination without incurring any significant cost. For example, a traveler
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Weizhi Meng. can share his reviews about different hotels or restaurants during his journey in TripAdvisor [1] . MCS is more capable, provides more flexibility and more efficient compared to other traditional sensing paradigms that are required to deploy a static wireless sensor network with specific sensors in most IoT systems. MCS has many useful and important applications in the field of IoT, a few of which include environment monitoring, intelligent transportation and social behavior sensing.
One such application of MCS is a community-based GPS navigation Waze [2] , where a driver with a predetermined destination can report the traffic conditions to the platform to gain some rewards, while taking the shortest path to destination. To earn more rewards, he may detour from the shortest path and go to the task location and perform more tasks. However, most of the existing studies on MCS has constraints on the tasks a worker can take. The worker is limited to take tasks either be within a circular region as Fig. 1a or follow a pre-concerted path that consists of a sequence of locations he will pass by, while driving towards his destination. He can either take tasks located on the assigned path directly as the blue line in Fig. 1b or take a detour to the locations of tasks and then return to the path as red line in Fig. 1c . In some scenarios, the worker just has an initial location, he can move to take a series of tasks to maximize his earnings [3] . All these mechanisms are less practical in the real MCS applications, such as Common Sense project for air quality monitoring [4] , and Creek Watch for watershed health monitoring [5] , where the worker perform tasks on their way to the destination. In this paper, we model each worker has a starting point and a predetermined destination, and he can select a path to perform tasks freely and efficiently.
Though MCS provides several benefits to IoT applications, it faces serious privacy issues. For example, during participatory sensing, users' contexts can be exposed through their smartphones [6] , [7] . This means that a user's sensitive information like locations, identity, interests and even mobility pattern can be revealed to the platform [8] . When the worker upload the sensing data, the data collector can derive abundant valuable knowledge from them [9] , [10] . In Mobile Crowd-Sensing, location privacy is one of the most critical privacy issues as most of the tasks being assigned to the user are location-based. Firstly, the user's exact location may be exposed directly while trying to find a task located in the same region. Secondly, the destination or any other sensitive location may be revealed indirectly, by inferring from the released innocent locations. Task rewards may inspire users (also named workers) to contribute more data which further increases the risk of privacy disclosure. Therefore, there should be a trade-off between compromise on privacy and utility for workers.
Existing works on location privacy preservation in MCS mainly focus on isolated location preserving. Methods include location hiding, perturbation, obfuscation, k-anonymity, differential privacy, etc. [11] - [14] . Among them, adding noise to isolated locations is very popular, and differential privacy is always adopted to achieve provable and measurable protection [15] . However, these studies cannot be applied to practical MCS systems as they ignore location dependency and worker's mobility. Those perturbed seemingly privacy-free locations may be used by the Bayesian adversaries to infer the destination. In addition, most of the existing works on privacy preservation during the task assignment are from the platform's perspective and assume that the platform is trusted or there is trusted third party [16] - [20] . In fact, the platform itself maybe a malicious adversary and as it has access to the user's contexts and mobility patterns, this information can be exploited. In addition, the communication between worker and the platform may be intercepted by eavesdroppers [21] . Therefore, it is highly necessary to sanitize the actual location before reporting it to the platform.
Considering these features, we investigate task selection in Mobile Crowd-Sensing in a more practical way and achieve comprehensive privacy preservation from the worker's perspective. In our scenario, the workers' starting point and destination are given, while they have the freedom over path selection. They can select routes according to the task's distribution to maximize their utilities while satisfying several constraints. First, the length of detouring is bounded, this places a constraint on how much a worker can divert from the shortest path. Second, the amount of location privacy disclosure is limited. To achieve comprehensive privacy protection, both the destination and passing locations are considered sensitive. The destination is always related to an important location that the worker preferred, such as home address or work place. These sensitive locations are vulnerable to Bayes inference attack when the adversary has worker's reported locations and mobility patterns. Therefore, the probability of an adversary getting the destination needs to be limited to a predetermined threshold. The passing locations that a worker reports while moving towards his destination may disclose his mobility model, so noise that within a certain range is added to each passing location before reporting it to the platform. This is done to preserve the location itself from the untrusted platform using differential privacy. The adversary may also infer an actual passing location through maximum likelihood estimation on the long-term observed obfuscated locations. To resist this inference attack, we publish the same obfuscated one for an actual location.
There are two main challenges to this strategy. Firstly, task selection is important, it must maximize the utility while meeting the detouring constrains, destination privacy threshold and location differential privacy. The underlying optimization problem can be proved to be NP-hard. Secondly, differential privacy and task rewards should be balanced. An inherent conflict exists between privacy and accuracy for location preserving mechanisms. The more noise introduced, the better privacy preserved, while lower service accuracy retained.
Thus, this paper works on a comprehensive locationprivacy-awareness task selection in Mobile Crowd-Sensing systems. Our objective is to maximize the worker's utility under the constrained capacity and detouring ratio. For each passing location, it satisfies -differential privacy within 77542 VOLUME 7, 2019 r max range. For the destination, the probability of adversary deriving it is bounded to be less than the worker's predetermined threshold. The constrained capacity limits the number of tasks a worker can take, and the detouring ratio limits the maximum length of detour a worker can make while traveling.
In our mechanisms, workers have the flexibility in selecting routes between the starting point and the destination. To meet the needs of different workers, the differential privacy factor and r max , the detouring ratio over the shortest distance, the privacy threshold on destination are all customized. The destination privacy preservation and passing location differential privacy can either be adopted separately or together depending on the scenario. We propose two mechanisms, one is just for destination privacy preservation when the platform is trusted, the other is for both when the platform is malicious. Finally, a real-world data set is utilized to validate the effectiveness of the mechanism. The experimental results reveal that the proposed mechanisms outperform existing solutions in terms of workers' profits. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We firstly introduce location differential privacy protection for task selection in Mobile Crowd-Sensing, workers can select routes flexibly and independently.
• We formulate the problem to maximize the worker's utilities under adjustable path selection in our system model, and proved it to be NP-hard.
• We propose two task selection mechanisms, one is just preserve the destination, while the other can protect the passing locations with differential privacy simultaneously.
• We evaluate our proposed mechanisms through extensive experiments on a real-world data set.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review the related works on privacy preserving and task selection in MCS. In Section III, we describe the problem formulation and privacy definition, including destination privacy and location differential privacy. We present our proposed privacy-awareness task selection mechanisms in Section IV. Experiment and results analysis are reported in Section V. We conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
A lot of research has been done for task selection in Mobile Crowd-Sensing. In the following, we review the related works from two aspects: location privacy in MCS and task assignment in MCS.
A. LOCATION PRIVACY IN MCS
In MCS, location exposure is inevitable for workers since all tasks are location-related. Yang et al. [22] studied the security and privacy in mobile crowdsourcing networks (MCNs), they consider sensed data and sensing tasks as the two main privacy threats. Sensed data may disclose the location where they were collected, and the sensing tasks are location-related directly. A worker's locations may be leaked to the platform during task selection when he is submitting his interested tasks in reverse auction [23] . Or they may be exposed to other malicious workers during the task allocation when the platform publishes the winners and payment for transparency [24] . Or they may be obtained by the task requesters during the sensed data uploading [25] . In this paper, we focus on the location privacy during task selection which is the first defense in privacy preservation in MCS.
To protect location privacy, cloaking, k-anonymity, partial publishing and other techniques are usually adopted [26] - [28] . The cloaking method hides workers' real location inside a cloaked region [16] or in a set of dummies [29] to prevent the adversary from getting the real location. k-anonymity is always used to protect a user from being identified from k users to protect user's identity [30] , [31] , it can also be used to protect the worker's location from k locations. Partial publishing technique publishes only a part of the locations and conceals the remaining, it is used to resist trajectory mining [32] - [34] . However, these studies are incapable of solving our problem as they protect a single location and ignore the spatial-temporal correlation. In this paper, we design a destination privacy preservation mechanism against adversary with strong background knowledge.
Differential privacy has been adopted recently to provide a stronger location privacy preservation. It originated from the context of database [35] - [37] . Then Chatzikokolakis et al. [38] broadened the scope of differential privacy using metrics. They explore the implications of differential privacy when the indistinguishability requirement depends on an arbitrary notion of distance, such as Hamming distance, Manhattan distance and Euclidean distance. Then differential privacy is widely used in trajectory data publishing. Andrés et al. [39] firstly introduced geoindistinguishability for location-based systems, which protects the user's location within a radius r with a certain level of privacy. Then, Wang et al. [40] introduced geoindistinguishability in MCS to provide privacy-preserving task allocation for the platform. We adopted the same concept to protect the passing locations for workers and focus on task selection to achieve a trade off between privacy and revenue.
B. TASK ASSIGNMENT IN MCS
Spatial task assignment is another important topic in MCS. Depending on who assigns/selects the tasks, the task assignment is classified into two categories: platform-centered and workers-centered. In platform-centered mechanisms, the platform recruits participants to take tasks to optimize some goals under certain constrains from the platform aspects [41] , [42] . In order to eliminate workers' concerns about privacy, many task assignment mechanisms take privacy preservation in to consideration [16] - [20] . In [16] , the authors utilized spatial cloaking to obfuscate workers' locations and propose a novel two-stage task assignment optimization approach which consists of global optimization VOLUME 7, 2019 with cloaked locations and local optimization with precise locations without breaching privacy. To et al. [17] proposed a mechanism that achieves effective Spatial Crowdsourcing services while offering privacy guarantees to workers by differential privacy and geocasting. In [18] , authors designed a scalable grouping based privacy-preserving participant selection scheme with workers' bid privacy preservation. In [19] , [20] , they adopted differential privacy to protect workers' location during the task selection. In the platformcentered mechanism, the platform is assumed to be trusted with protecting workers' privacy, which is impossible in practice. In workers-centered mechanisms, participators select tasks autonomously under their constrains to optimize task rewards [43] from the worker's perspective. In this paper, we investigate the privacy-aware task selection from the perspective of workers in MCS.
Constrains on worker's task selection has great affects on worker's flexibility, which determined the optional problem space. In some mechanisms, participators are only allowed to take task within interested region. In [44] , participators are allowed to move to the target location to take tasks. Li et al. [45] model a worker has a starting point and a predetermined destination, they proposed location-based online task assignment and path planning, which aims to maximize total task quality under limited travel distance budget. This is the most related work to our research. But they do not take the workers' location privacy into account. In addition, workers' travel distance budget is determined by the detouring rate in our model, which is more practical in the real MCS applications.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PRIVACY DEFINITION
In this section, we first formalize the task selection problem in MCS, then we define the destination privacy, and location differential privacy. Table 1 gives a list of frequently used notations in this paper.
A. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In our Mobile Crowd-Sensing system, there are a crowd of workers and a cloud platform. The platform initially publishes K sensing tasks to workers, denoted as T = {t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t K }. Each task t j is associated with a unique location l j and rewards b j . For each worker u in MCS, she has a starting point s and a destination d. She can select path to take tasks under the limited capacity C flexibly. The capacity is the total number of tasks a worker u may take. To perform more tasks and gain more rewards, worker u is allowed to detour and travel more distance instead of taking the shortest path. However, the detouring rate δ which is the maximum distance she may travel over the shortest distance between s and d must be limited. To avoid the direct competition on a task among too many workers, worker u bids a sequence of locations L = {l 1 , l 2 , · · · , l m } with an radius r instead of bidding a set of tasks directly, where m is not greater than the capacity C. For each location l i in L, the platform will assign a task within its range randomly. Fig. 2 illustrates the task selection for worker in Mobile Crowd-Sensing. The red and blue building denote the stating point and destination, respectively. The blue man and red tag denote reported locations and tasks. The circle is the range of task assignment for the central position, a task within the circle will be allocated to the worker when she is bidding the central location. All the selected locations make a path between the starting point s and destination d. The dashed line is the shortest path between s and d and the solid line is the reported path. Both the number of selected locations and the length of path is limited.
We coordinate privacy including destination privacy and reported locations privacy. On one hand, the adversary can infer the destination through the reported path. On the other hand, the exact reported locations are exposed to the platform. So both the destination and reported location privacy are considered in task selection for each worker. Firstly, the destination is protected under a certain threshold θ to resist 77544 VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. Task selection in mobile crowd-sensing.
inference attack. Then, for each location l i in the bidding sequence L, some noise is added before reporting it. An extended version of location differential privacy is adopted in paper to provide a provable and calculable privacy preservation.
The object of this framework is to maximize the profit of worker while meeting the destination privacy and location differential privacy requirements. Also, the capacity of workers should not be violated. The task selection problem is formalized as follows:
where G is all the locations on the map, B(l j , r) is the expected profit of reporting location l j with radius r. Equation (2) limits the ration of detouring, equation (3) protects the destination under a certain threshold θ, equation (4) makes sure that each reported location (x l i = 1 indicates location l i is reported) meets the -differential privacy and equation (5) limits the worker's capacity. x l j indicates whether location l j is reported or not.
B. DESTINATION PRIVACY
Destination is an important privacy in location related service since it is usually sensitive for people. Previous research has shown that hiding the destination does not necessarily protect it since the adversary can get it through inference attack. Here the destination privacy is defined as the probability that an adversary can infer the destination under observed reported locations. When the adversary gets the reported path T r , the destination privacy is Pr(d|T r ). Since the assumption that worker's motion follows the first-order Markov model, the destination is only determined by the last reported location v in T r , so the Pr(d|T r ) can be computed as follows:
where d is the destination, p i v,d is the probability that worker starts from v and ends at d through i steps. Location v may be reported with Laplace noise when location differential privacy is introduced. To improve the accuracy of inference, the adversary may infer the actual location v firstly, then use v to infer the destination. Moreover, the motion direction of the reported path T r may also be used to improve the accuracy of prediction, since the worker may not walk back towards the starting point. Here the detouring rate is used to limit worker's traveling back.
When the adversary gets v and d, she first determines the minimum d min (v, d) and maximum d max (v, d ) steps between v and d that the worker may walk through adjacent grids to the destination, and they cannot walk infinitely in the urban area. Since the platform divides the area into grids, each worker is allowed to move into any one of the 8 adjacent grids. Considering the motion direction, worker may only move into some direction towards the destination. 
where ε is the detouring rate, which differs from the worker's total detouring rate δ.
C. LOCATION DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
To protect the reported locations' privacy, differential privacy is introduced. Differential privacy is originated from statistical databases. It protects an individual's data when they publish the aggregate information [35] . For database D 1 and its adjacent D 2 differing by a single row, the query A's result on them should be similar enough. The standard differential privacy is defined as (8) , where is the privacy factor.
To extend the notion of differential privacy and apply it into different application scenarios, many distance metrics are introduced to quality the distinguish-ability level between D 1 and D 2 [38] , [46] . For location differential privacy, Euclidean distance is by no means the best choice. Then the location differential privacy can be formulated as (9) , where d e (x, x ) is the Euclidean distance between location x and x and is the level of privacy in one unit of distance equals l/r max .
To achieve differential privacy, Laplace noise is always introduced. A small region on the earth can be seen as a plane and location can be denoted by two dimension longitude and latitude. For an actual location x ∈ R 2 , we generate a fake point x ∈ R 2 randomly according to the 2-dimensions Laplace distribution. It has been proved that it can satisfy -geo-indistinguishability in [36] . The probability density function(pdf) is:
where equals 1/λ in standard Laplace distribution, and 2 /2π is a normalization factor. In our mechanism, the sensing area is divided into grids, we denote each location as a grid instead of a point. Therefore, we need to report a perturbed grid for an actual location. Firstly, we construct the reporting grid set R(g, r max ) for the actual grid g:
where d e (g , g) is the Euclidean distance between the central position of the grid g and grid g . When d e (g , g) is smaller than r max minus √ 2/2, there must be a position x in grid g that satisfies d e (x, x ) ≤ r max and x is the central position of grid g. Here, it is assumed the step units along the two dimensions of grid are same and equal to 1.
Secondly, we determine the probability of each reporting gird g in R(g, r max ) for the actual grid g. The probability should be proportion to average distance between the central of grid g and position in grid g .
where x is the central position of grid g, S is all positions x located in grid g with d e (x , x) ≤ r max . Fig. 3 illustrates the location differential. The red square is the actual grid g, and the gray square is the reporting grid g . It can be seen that only a part of grid g are located within the range r max , some positions are out of boundary. For this kind of grids, the probability Pr(g |g) may be very small, which will reduce the differential privacy. Therefore, we remove those grids with d e (g, g ) > r max from the reporting grid set R(g, r max ).
Finally, we normalized the probability Pr(g |g) for each grid g in the reporting grid set by (13) . When selecting a grid g, we will report a grid g with the probability Pr(g |g).
Pr(g |g) =
Pr(g |g)
IV. PRIVACY-AWARENESS TASK SELECTION
In this section, we first show the destination protection under the inference attack, then we design the task selection with and without the location differential privacy preserving.
A. ACQUIRING RISK LOCATIONS FOR DESTINATION PROTECTION
Destination is an important location for users that contain sensitive information, such as home or work place, health condition (eg. hospital), or interests (eg. bar or bookstore). It has been proved that simple location hiding can not protect destination when the adversary has the knowledge of mobility model. In this paper, it is assumed that users' mobility obeys Markov model which is also maintained by the adversary.
Since it follows first-order Markov model, the destination prediction is only determined by the last location that user reported. For a worker, she can not take tasks at some place around the destination to protect it. When the worker's destination is d, she would like to find the risk locations that may leak her destination privacy beyond the threshold. She first sets the MaxSteps that adversary may use while trying to infer the destination, a greater value means stronger privacy protection but more risk locations not to take tasks. Actually, when the MaxSteps is greater than 5, it is meaningless for adversary to predict the destination because there are more than 8 5 paths with similar probability the worker may take. In addition, we take detouring ε into consideration, the actual max steps equals MaxSteps × (1 + ε). Therefore, the MaxSteps does not have to be too large to resist the inference attack [47] .
After setting the MaxSteps, the worker will check her reachable neighbors from one-step to MaxSteps whether it is beyond the destination privacy threshold θ or not. When the probability is greater than θ, add the location into RiskLocations. For each step n, the reachable neighbors must be the n − steps first-arrival, which means 
The pseudo-code of RiskLocations acquiring is given in Algorithm 1.
B. SIMPLE TASK SELECTION
After acquiring the risk locations for destination protection, we select tasks to maximize our objective. We consider the simple task selection by temporarily ignoring the location differential privacy since there is not a strong need for location privacy in some scenarios. The problem can be formalized like Section III while removing the constraint (4). It is easy to prove this problem to be NP-hard.
Theorem 1: The simple task selection problem is NP-hard. Proof: We prove that the simple task selection problem is NP-hard by reduction from 0-1 knapsack problem. for all location j ∈ ReachableSources do 5:
Add location j into RiskLocations; 8: end if 9: end if 10: end for 11: n ← n + 1; 12: end while Between starting point and destination, the worker needs to select limited locations to form a path connecting them. The locations are goods in 0-1 knapsack problem. Firstly, the available locations are limited by the detouring rate. Then, each location has a profit and a cost. The profit is the average rewards the worker can get when she selecting this location. And the cost is the detouring length which is determined by the pre-location and post-location. The total detouring length is limited, it is like the capacity in knapsack problem. Anymore, the worker can only select limited locations. Each location is indivisible, the worker must select it or not. Then this problem is the same as 0-1 knapsack problem. Thus, the simple task selection problem is NP-hard.
Even though the problem is proved to be NP-hard, it is meaningful to find the optimal solution with exponential time complexity when the number of available locations is relatively small. To solve this problem, we propose Simple Task Selection algorithm (STS for short) which is based on the idea of branch and bound method. It removes the unsatisfactory locations from the whole search space iteratively, i.e, those locations violate the detouring length. Meanwhile, STS will check each branch and prune the impossible solution. For clarity, we introduce the following notations.
Definition 1: The SafeLocations between starting point s and ending point d that meeting the detouring length l detour is denoted as f (s, d, l detour ). They are all locations on the map that meets the detouring length.
where 
Definition 3: The ExpectedProfits of location l j with an radius r, denoted as B(l j , r), is the expected profit a worker can gain when she reports this location and radius. It is the average rewards of tasks minus the traveling cost from reported location l j to task's location l p . B(l j
where b p is the rewards of task t p at location l p , γ is the scale factor, |T (l j , r)| is the number of elements in T (l j , r). When a worker is selecting locations, a task t k may be within the range of two locations l i and l j . For the later location, the platform will select tasks from the remaining ones randomly. The probability of assigning tasks in the later location will be influenced by the former task allocation. For the j-th location, it is influenced by the first j − 1 locations, and there are 2 j(j−1)/2 combinations which is difficult to compute. Fortunately, it is not influenced too much by the former locations. To simplify the problem, it is not allowed to have the common tasks for any two locations in the selecting path P = {l 1 , l 2 , · · · , l m }, this constrains can be described as follows:
To select path between the starting point s and ending point d to maximize the profit with limited capacity C, detouring rate δ and destination privacy threshold θ for worker u, the proposed STS mainly includes two phases.
Phase 1: initialization and destination protection. The algorithm acquires available reporting locations that satisfy the destination privacy threshold. The detailed steps are as follows.
1) Acquire SafeLocations between starting point s and destination d that meets the detouring rate δ. The detouring length is l detour = d m (s, d) · δ. Then the SafeLocations can be obtained by (14) .
2) Remove RiskLocations that violate the destination privacy threshold from the SafeLocations. The RiskLocations can be obtained by using Algorithm 1. Now, locations in the SafeLocations meets the destination privacy preservation and detouring rate requirements.
3) Initialize ExpectedProfits for each location in SafeLocations through (16), they will be used in the subsequent path selection. 4) Get the LowerBound of maximum profits with a Greedy Simple Task Selection algorithm (GSTS for short). The basic idea of GSTS is selecting the location with maximum profit each time until the capacity runs out. After each selection, the available detouring length is updated and locations violating the detouring length will be removed from the available locations.
Phase 2: the algorithm builds a tree with the starting point s as the root node. Each node has available locations SafeLocations it can select in next step, the current profit τ , VOLUME 7, 2019 the left available detouring length detour . Phase 1 initializes these properties of the starting point s, then the algorithm repeats the following procedure until there is no capacity left or no available location can be selected. 1) Select a location l j in the SafeLocations of current node; 2) Check whether τ plus the B(l j , r) and the maximum expected profit of left locations UpPro is larger than the LowerBound;
3) If yes, add location l j as a child node of this node, update τ , l detour and SafeLocations for this node. The locations having common tasks with the selected location should also be removed from SafeLocations. Then update the LowerBound with max(LowerBound, τ + LowPro), where LowPro is the lower bound of left locations. Otherwise, go to step (1) and select the next location; 4) When all the locations in the SafeLocations of current node are visited, go to next brother node and go to step (1); 5) When all the brothers are visited, the length of the current path k = k + 1. Then, go to visit the next generation, select a child node and go to step (1).
After Phase 2, STS builds a solution space tree, each path that starts from the root ends at a leaf is a solution. The leaf with the maximum current profit is the optimal solution, the path is the location selection and τ is the maximum profit a worker can gain.
The purpose of STS in step (2) of Phase 2 is to reduce the invalid solution space. The UpPro is the maximum profit that can be obtained while ignoring the detouring length, it is the sum of top-C left rewards in the SafeLocations, where C left is the left capacity for worker. It is the upper bound for left locations.
The pseudo-code of STS is given in Algorithm 2, where Path[k] is all the paths of length k. Line 1 to Line 7 is Phase 1, and Line 8 to Line 31 is Phase 2.
C. LOCATION-PRIVACY-AWARENESS TASK SELECTION
In Simple Task Selection, the reported location may be maintained by the platform and used to model or update the worker's mobility. To protect the reported locations, location differential privacy is introduced. Instead of reporting an actual location, the worker can report a location with some noise. We propose a Location-Privacy-Awareness Task Selection, (LPTS for short). The basic idea of LPTS is similar to that of STS with three main differences: the expected profit of locations, the location conflicting limitations and the destination privacy preservation.
Firstly, the expected profit of selected location is different from that in STS.
In LPTS, when the worker selecting a location l j , she will report a location l j with a certain probability. The expected profit of l j will be the sum of conditional expectation, it can be computed as follows: for each path p t ∈ Path[k] do 10: k ← k + 1;
11:
PreLocation l p ← p t .LastLocation;
12:
NextLocations ← l p .SafeLocations;
13:
if NextLocations = ∅ then 14: for each location l j ∈ NextLocations do 15 :
16:
17:
Remove locations with overlapping task; 19: τ ← l p .τ + B(l j , r); 20: if τ + UpPro > LowerBound then 21: Update τ, ł detour for l j ; 22: Update SafeLocations for l j ; if τ + LowPro > LowerBound then 25: LowerBound ← τ + LowPro; 26: end if 27: end if 28: end for 29: end if 30: end for 31: end while where d e (l j , l j ) is the Euclidean distance between location l j and l j , Pr(l j |l j ) is the probability of reporting location l j when selecting l j , which can be obtained by (12) .
It should be notice that, the location privacy preservation will reduce when there are not enough perturbed locations within the original location range. For the edge locations on the map, they can not be selected since most of perturbed locations are out of the map. This means the edge r max grids can not be selected.
Secondly, for any two selected locations, they must not have common locations within the r max .
If two selected locations have the common locations within r max , the perturbed location of selected locations may be the same. In Fig. 4b , location l k may be the perturbed location of l i and l j . This will reduce the location differential privacy preservation and the expected profit of selected locations. In STS, it is not allowed for two selected locations to have common tasks to get a more accurate expected profit. Two locations having a common task is considered as conflict selection in STS, such as task t k is within the range of location l i and l j in Fig. 4a . The red tag is a task, and the blue man is a location. In LPTS, we pay more attention on the differential privacy than the accurate expected profit. Therefore, it is allowed that the perturbed locations have common tasks. That means two reported locations can have a common task within their range.
Thirdly, the destination privacy preservation is different from it in STS.
In LPTS, the worker reports a location with a certain probability. So even though the selected location does not disclose the destination, the perturbed location may expose it. It should be careful when selecting the last location since only the last location will affect the destination prediction. For a selected location l j , the probability of getting the destination can be obtained through (19) . The selected location l j should be added into RiskLocations when Pr(d|l j , r max ) > θ.
Besides these three differences, LPTS is similar to the STS. LPTS also has two phase.
In the first phase, LPTS acquires the SafeLocations that satisfies the detouring rate, and then it removes the RiskLocations from the SafeLocations to protect the destination. This is followed by removing locations that do not have enough locations within r max to provide location differential privacy. Now, each location in SafeLocations can be selected as the next location that satisfies the detouring rate, destination privacy preservation and location differential privacy. At last, it initializes the expected profit of each location in SafeLocations the by (18) .
In the second phase, LPTS adopts branch and bound method to achieve the maximum expected profits of selected locations. The detailed processing is similar to the phase 2 in STS. There are only two parts in Algorithm 2 need to be changed: 1) Remove the locations with overlapping perturbed locations instead of overlapping tasks in Line 18; 2) Replace the B(l j , r) with LPB(l j , r) in Line 19.
D. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we will analyze the performance of our proposed algorithm.
Theorem 2: LSTS achieves ( , r max ) differential privacy for each passing location.
Proof: Let l and l be two passing grids with d e (l, l ) ≤ r max , respectively. Let A(l) and A(l ) denote the grids reported by algorithm LSTS. z is a grid within range of both grid l and l . We consider the relative probability of LSTS for given passing location l and l .
Pr(A(l)
Observe now that
Most of perturbed grids are full located within the range of actual grid and only the edge perturbed grids are exceptions. We remove the grids with its central position outing the boundary to decrease the number of girds having very small part located in range. Therefore, the difference between two grids in area can be neglected. For a position in S, there must be a corresponding position in S , where their distance equals the distance between the central position of two grids. Therefore, we can derive:
By triangular inequality we obtain
Since the d e (l, l ) ≤ r max , finally, we can conclude that LPTS achieves ( , r max ) differential privacy for each passing location. (s, d)(1 + 2δ) ) 2·C ).
Theorem 3: The complexity of STS and LPTS are O((d h
Proof: The complexity of STS and LPTS are mainly affected by the task selection processing. The number of selectable locations is determined by the length of path and detouring rate. Fig. 5 illustrates the safe locations between two positions. In the worst situation, the maximum area of the rectangle is (d h (s, d) (1 + 2δ)/2) 2 when the number of columns and rows between the starting point s and d are equal. STS and LPTS are the optimal algorithm, they select C locations to maximize the profit. So the complexity of STS and LPTS are O ((d h (s, d)(1 + 2δ) ) 2·C ). Fortunately, STS and LPTS can run faster than that since we use branch and bound technique. After each selection, we remove the invalid solutions from the solution space. In Fig. 5 , the red squares are starting point and destination, and the blue square is the current selected location. Then the gray squares must be removed from the search space because they violating the detouring rate. We can see the search space decreases too much after one selection.
Theorem 4: The extra traveling distance incurred by selecting locations instead of tasks in STS is no larger than 2 r · C.
Proof: In STS, we select the locations instead of tasks. Therefore, the worker may travel more to the tasks than to the selected locations. Since the distance between actual task and selected location is no more than r, the extra travel distance VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 5. The change in search space after one selection. is no larger 2r for each selected location. That is because the worker should travel to the actual task and return to the selected location. Therefore, the total extra travel distance is no larger than 2 r · C for C tasks. To avoid this case, we can subtract the 2 r · C from the constrained traveling distance (d h (s, d)(1 + δ)) when we initializing the SafeLocations.
V. EXPERIMENT EVALUATION A. EXPERIMENT SETTINGS
We evaluate our mechanisms on a real-world dataset from Gowalla [48] , which is a location-based social networking website allowing users to share their locations by checkins. We just use the data from 22 September 2009 to 22 October 2010 in London. The data of London contains 70053 check-ins and the density of check-ins in London is shown in Fig. 6 . We can see that most of the check-ins are mainly appeared in the urban centers. So we publish tasks in this area to make sure there are enough participants. The area of London is within the longitude (−0.228,−0.028) and latitude (51.409,51.609).
In the experiment, we divide the urban area into 20 × 20 grids, and build a first-order Markov model M R * R from the check-ins, representing the transition of workers among different grids, where R = 20 × 20. The Markov model is used for destination privacy preservation. The distribution of tasks obeys the density of check-ins in the city. The worker's starting point and destination are randomly selected. The worker's capacity is set to be proportional to the path length.
We compared our STS and LPTS with two greedy algorithm GTS and GLPTS.
• STS: The task selection is simple and only with destination preservation.
• GTS: It is a greedy version of STS, it always select the locations with maximum profit at each selection until the capacity runs out.
• LPTS: Apart from the destination preservation in STS, each selected location is protected by -differential privacy under a certain range r max .
• GLPTS: It is a greedy version of LPTS like GTS. We evaluate the performance of our proposed mechanisms with four metrics: rewards, traveling distance, profits and running time.
• Rewards: The rewards a worker get from the platform after executing tasks.
• Traveling distance: The real total distance a worker travels from the starting point to destination.
• Profits: Subtracting γ times the traveling distance from rewards. γ is set to be 1 in our experiment for simplify.
• Running time: the processing time of task selection for a worker.
In the remainder of this section, Part B investigates the impacts of privacy, including destination privacy θ and ( , r max )-differential privacy; Part C evaluates the impacts of tasks density; and Part D evaluates the impacts of capacity, including detouring rate and the capacity per unit path length.
B. EFFECT OF PRIVACY
In this subsection, we evaluate the impact of privacy. We set the density of tasks to be 0.4, the worker capacity C to be 5, worker's detouring rate δ to be 0.5. The maximum distance between starting point and destination is 15.
We first evaluate the impact of privacy threshold on destination. Different θ i 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25 were used. A smaller θ i means the adversary can get the destination with a lower probability, so it provides a stronger privacy preservation for worker. The differential privacy of LPTS is set to be ( , r max ) = (2, 3). Fig. 7 shows the results in task rewards, traveling distance and absolute profits. As we can see, all these metrics increase with the increasing of privacy threshold. That's because workers can take more tasks when the privacy threshold is larger. More locations around destination are considered safe for workers when a larger threshold is set. STS can achieve the greater task rewards and absolute profits. It does not provide location differential privacy, so it can take more tasks than LPTS. It's an optimal solution compared to GTS. The difference between the STS and LPTS is the cost of differential privacy preservation. STS can achieve nearly 1.25 times rewards and profits than LPTS when θ < 0.15. The differences become larger when the threshold increases. GTS can achieve better profits than LPTS, it means the cost of differential privacy preservation is larger than the greedy algorithm loss.
We then evaluate the impacts of differential privacy for workers. The privacy threshold of destination θ is set to 0.1. The differential privacy factor = l/r max , where l is the privacy level within the r max . The privacy level l ranges from 4 to 12 with step-size 2, and r max is set as 3 and 4. Fig. 8 shows the results. It is seen that as the privacy level increases, the tasks rewards, traveling distance and absolute profit increase slowly for the same r max . It means that the privacy level has a little affect on the performance when the range r max is fixed. While the difference of evaluation metrics between r max = 3 and r max = 4 is very large for the same privacy level. For the same privacy level, the larger the r max , stronger is the differential privacy achieved. At the same time, the cost is obvious. Nearly 23.5% profits is sacrificed for per unit privacy level. The reason is as follows. Differential privacy is determined by the privacy level and range r max . When the r max changes a little, the will changes a lot. But when the r max is large, alterations in the numerator will affect the fraction weakly. Fig. 8d shows the running time with varying privacy level. It can be seen that the running time of LPTS are similar for different r max , nearly 4 seconds, while the greedy algorithm GLPTS can finish the task selection within 0.1 seconds. We can see that the r max affects the running time a little. That is because r max don't change the solution space which mainly determines the running time.
C. EFFECT OF DENSITY OF TASKS
In this subsection, we conduct simulations to observe the effect of density of tasks. We fixed the destination privacy threshold to be 0.1 and the differential privacy ( , r max ) = (2, 3). We used different tasks density 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8. Fig. 9 shows the rewards, traveling distance, profits and the running time, as the density of tasks changes. It can be seen that there is a significant reduction in the profits for STS and GTS. However, it has a little influence on the LPTS and GLPTS. The reason is as follows. STS selects locations without common tasks. Nevertheless, LPTS selects locations without common positions as Fig. 4 . As the density of tasks increase, there are more tasks on the map. Most of locations within the r range have common tasks are seen as conflict selection in STS. Therefore, less locations can be selected, the rewards and profits reduce dramatically. While, LPTS and GLPTS select locations without common position, so the task density has little affect on them. STS can still achieve the best performance as the conflict locations are less than that in LPTS. Fig. 9d shows the running time when varying the density of tasks. We can see that the running time of LPTS and GLPTS remain unchanged, which means the size of solution space stays the same. This also illustrates that the density of tasks has little affect on rewards and profits for LPTS and GLPTS.
D. EFFECT OF CAPACITY
In this subsection, we conduct simulations to observe the effects of capacity. The worker's capacity is determined by two aspects: the detouring rate and the capacity per unit path length. We set the destination privacy threshold and the differential privacy as that in subsection V-C and the length of path is set to be 16. Fig. 10 shows the impacts of detouring rate which varies from 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 to 0.5 while capacity is 5. The detouring rate determines the tasks space where worker can select tasks. With the increase in detouring rate, all curves increase quickly. While the increasing speed becomes slower when the detouring rate is larger. That is because when the detouring rate is large enough, the tasks selection is mainly determined by the number of tasks the worker can take. When the capacity nearly runs out, the detouring rate will have little influence on the task selection. Fig. 10d shows the running time when varying the detouring rate. We can see that the running time of STS and LPTS increase exponentially, while the greedy algorithm GTS and GLPTS keep steady. That is because the STS and LPTS always find the optimal solution. To trade off between the profits and running time, we prefer to adopt STS and LPTS when the detouring rate is smaller than 0.3. Otherwise, we'd better use the greedy algorithm as they can achieve similar profits with less running time. Fig. 11 shows the impacts of capacity per unit path length. The detouring rate is set to 0.5 and the capacity per unit path length varies from 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25 to 0.30. It can be seen that the effects is stepped for STS and GTS. This is because the capacity must be integer, therefore, the impacts are influenced by the ratio when the path length is fixed. With increasing accumulation, the STS and GTS increase much when the capacity increases to 1. While, the LPTS remains unchanged when the ratio is increasing. That means LPTS is mainly influenced by differential privacy when the capacity is small. The results of running time is same with that in detouring rate. That is because the detouring rate determines the solution space for the first step. While, the capacity per unit path length determines the depth of search processing. The running time is mainly affected by the size of solution. Therefore, they has the same performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate task selection under comprehensive privacy preservation for workers in MCS. The worker has flexibility in task selection and the path is adjustable between starting point and destination. We propose a novel task selection mechanism, which provides a comprehensive location privacy preservation including destination privacy and location differential privacy. Two task selection algorithms STS and LPTS based on branch and bounds method are proposed to maximize worker's profit under different levels of privacy preservation. We proved that our proposed LPTS can achieve ( , r max ) differential privacy for each passing location. And we also analyze the complexity of STS and LPTS, and the upper bound of extra traveling distance in STS. The extensive experiments on real-world data set validate the performance of our framework. It achieves high profits in task selection while preserving workers' destination and selected location privacy.
In the future, we plan to design some heuristic algorithm to find the approximate profit when the search space is large. In addition, we would like to combine the goals of the platform, such as task completion rate, the total payments with the goals of the workers. 
